Russia’s Budget..$79 Billion Deficit
Russia’s Budget Gap Keeps Widening: Inside the Numbers Behind a $79 Billion Defici
There’s a particular kind of economic story that doesn’t announce itself with a single dramatic headline. It builds slowly, month by month, in dry finance ministry press releases and dense analyst notes, until one day the cumulative picture is impossible to ignore. Russia’s federal budget deficit is exactly that kind of story right now. Seven months into 2026, the gap between what Moscow is spending and what it’s bringing in has climbed past $78 billion, and the trajectory — not just the number itself — is what should have people paying attention.
This isn’t a sudden crisis. It’s the continuation of a trend that’s been building since the start of the war in Ukraine, accelerated by a punishing combination of falling energy revenue and relentless government spending. To understand where things stand now, it helps to walk through the numbers month by month, look at what’s driving both sides of the ledger, and then ask the harder question: how long can this actually continue, and what happens when the cushion runs out?
According to Russia’s Finance Ministry, the federal budget deficit reached 6.46 trillion rubles — roughly $78.2 billion — over the first seven months of 2026, equal to 2.8% of GDP. That’s a meaningful jump from the month before, when the deficit stood at 5.7 trillion rubles, or 2.5% of GDP, through the first half of the year. In other words, in July alone, the shortfall widened by about 760 billion rubles, or roughly $9 billion, in a single month.
To put that in perspective against the government’s own plans: the original 2026 budget law targeted a full-year deficit of just 3.786 trillion rubles, or 1.6% of GDP. Russia blew through that target well before the midpoint of the year. By April, the deficit had already exceeded the annual ceiling by roughly 60%, and it’s kept climbing since. The government’s own revised expectations have crept upward too — from 4.83 trillion rubles in one internal projection to a Bank of Finland estimate that puts the full consolidated budget deficit (which includes regional budgets and state social funds, not just the federal government) as high as 6.9 trillion rubles for the year, nearly double what Russia recorded in 2025.
This pattern of chronic underestimation isn’t new. Research from the Free Russia Foundation has tracked how, in the fall of each of the past several years, the Kremlin has published a budget forecast for the following year that ultimately proved far too optimistic. Going back to 2022, the deficit forecast for 2023 was pegged at 2.0% of GDP with expectations of it shrinking further in subsequent years. It never shrank as planned. By late 2024, Russia was projecting a deficit of just 0.5% of GDP for 2025 — the actual figure came in at 2.6%, more than five times higher than the official number, and the highest level of red ink since the 2020 pandemic. If 2026 follows the same script, the eventual full-year number could land meaningfully above even the revised estimates currently circulating.
Two Forces Pulling in Opposite Directions
A budget deficit is, at its core, a simple equation: revenue minus spending. What makes Russia’s current situation notable isn’t the mechanism — it’s that both halves of the equation are moving the wrong way at the same time, and have been for most of the year.
The Revenue Side: Oil and Gas Losing Their Grip
For decades, Russia’s federal budget has leaned heavily on energy exports. Oil and gas revenue has functioned as the fiscal backbone of the state — the resource that let Moscow fund everything from social spending to, in recent years, an enormous and growing war effort. That backbone has been cracking throughout 2026.
The year started poorly. In January 2026 alone, oil and gas revenues collapsed by 50.2% year-on-year, falling to just 393 billion rubles, and dragging total federal revenue down 11.6% for the month. Non-oil revenue, buoyed by an 18.5% jump in turnover taxes including VAT, couldn’t fully offset the hole left by energy. The pattern held through the first half of the year: oil-and-gas revenue was down 22.7% year-on-year in January-June, totaling 3.661 trillion rubles — below even the government’s own reduced baseline expectations for the period, largely a function of weaker oil prices earlier in the year.
Zooming out to the July data specifically, the trend has continued, with oil and gas revenues down 16.8% for the January-July period even as the government pushed total spending up 14.5% over the same stretch.
What’s driving the energy revenue collapse is a mix of price dynamics and structural sanctions pressure that has evolved in complicated, sometimes counterintuitive ways over the course of the year. The EU and UK lowered their price cap on Russian crude to $44.10 a barrel effective February 1, 2026, tightening the mechanism first introduced back in late 2022. For much of the year, the price of Urals-grade crude — Russia’s key export blend — has traded well above that cap regardless, reflecting the cap’s limited real-world bite. In January, Urals averaged around $54 a barrel; by March and April, a global supply shock (tied in part to disruptions around the Middle East and the Strait of Hormuz) pushed prices dramatically higher, with Urals briefly touching the $94–112 range and Brent crude spiking as high as $113–114 a barrel. That temporary surge briefly worked in Russia’s favor: April’s mineral extraction tax — the primary levy on crude production — was projected to roughly double month-on-month, from about 327 billion rubles in March to an estimated 700 billion rubles.
But that spike didn’t hold. By June, Urals prices had fallen 26% month-on-month to roughly $63 a barrel, and by July they’d eased further to around $60. Throughout the summer, the discount on Urals relative to Brent has hovered in the 25–28% range — meaning Russian crude is trading at a persistent $21–24 per barrel discount to the global benchmark, even as the letter of the Western price cap goes largely unenforced. That discount, sustained month after month, is a direct drag on the ruble-denominated tax take from every barrel Russia exports.
Layered on top of price volatility is the physical infrastructure of Russia’s sanctions evasion. Monthly tracking from the Centre for Research on Energy and Clean Air shows that in mid-2026, more than half of Russia’s seaborne oil exports — 53–54% — moved through so-called “shadow” tankers operating outside G7-aligned insurance and shipping frameworks, a workaround that lets Russian crude keep flowing to buyers like China and India but typically at a cost: reduced pricing power, added logistics expense, and periodic disruption when individual tankers or intermediaries get sanctioned. China alone accounted for roughly half of Russia’s fossil fuel export revenue from its top five buyers earlier in the year, with crude oil making up the bulk of that trade.
The net effect of all this — price caps that mostly don’t bind, a persistent Urals discount, a shadow fleet that adds cost and friction, and genuine price volatility tied to global events — is an energy revenue stream that is smaller, more volatile, and less reliable than the one Russia’s budget was built around a few years ago. When oil and gas revenue was the base case that budget planners could count on, deficits were manageable. That base case doesn’t hold the way it used to.
The Spending Side: No Sign of a Slowdown
If the revenue side of Russia’s ledger is a story about erosion, the spending side is a story about acceleration. Federal expenditures rose 14.5% year-on-year in the January-July window, adding to a pattern that’s persisted through the entire year. In the first quarter alone, spending growth ran at a rate that pushed the Q1 deficit to 4.576 trillion rubles, nearly two and a half times the size of the Q1 2025 shortfall.
Some of that acceleration has a mundane explanation: the government has been front-loading contract payments and advance disbursements, a practice the Finance Ministry itself has cited as inflating early-year spending figures relative to a more typical, evenly distributed spending pattern. But even accounting for that timing effect, the cumulative trend across the year points to something more structural than a temporary quirk in contract scheduling.
Perhaps the most striking figure comes from analysis published by the Bank of Finland’s research arm, which noted that consolidated government spending — federal, regional, and state social funds combined — rose 20% year-on-year in the January-July period. That’s an extraordinary pace, and the Bank of Finland’s analysts pointed out the mathematical implication: for the full-year spending estimate to hold, expenditure growth would essentially need to flatline for the remainder of 2026. Given how spending has behaved so far this year, few analysts expect that kind of abrupt deceleration, which raises the real possibility that the final full-year deficit ends up even larger than the already-elevated projections currently on the table.
Much of this spending is tied, directly or indirectly, to the war. Defense allocations have swelled dramatically since 2022 — one estimate put Russia’s defense budget at roughly 13.5 trillion rubles (around $145 billion) for 2025 alone, and that figure doesn’t fully capture the off-budget military and industrial spending that flows through state banks and state-owned enterprises, financed in part by National Wealth Fund deposits and central bank liquidity facilities. That kind of spending is politically and strategically difficult for the Kremlin to scale back, which is part of why the spending side of the equation has proven so much stickier than the revenue side.
Financing the Gap: Bonds, Reserves, and a Shrinking Cushion
A widening deficit only becomes a genuine crisis if a government runs out of ways to finance it. So far, Russia hasn’t reached that point — but the tools it’s using to bridge the gap are each showing signs of strain.
The National Wealth Fund Is Draining
Russia’s National Wealth Fund (NWF) — the sovereign wealth fund built up over years of oil windfalls, and the country’s primary shock absorber for exactly this kind of fiscal pressure — has been drawn down aggressively. At the start of 2026, the fund’s liquid assets (the portion that can actually be converted to cash quickly, as opposed to long-term illiquid investments) stood at around 4.1 trillion rubles, or about $52.9 billion. In mid-January, the Finance Ministry announced it would sell foreign currency and gold from the fund at the fastest daily pace on record — faster even than during the peak of the COVID-19 crisis — specifically to offset the shortfall in oil and gas tax collections.
The fund’s liquid reserves have continued to slide over the course of the year, though the picture has fluctuated somewhat month to month as global asset prices (particularly gold) have moved. By June 1, liquid assets had fallen to roughly 2.8 trillion rubles (about $36.4 billion), the lowest level since 2019 and a dramatic decline from the fund’s prewar peak of $113.5 billion in early 2022 — meaning the liquid portion of the fund has lost more than two-thirds of its value in dollar terms since the invasion began. By July 1, the figure had recovered somewhat to around 3.61 trillion rubles ($46.4 billion), and by August 1 it stood at 3.69 trillion rubles ($46.2 billion) — a reminder that currency and gold revaluation effects can move the headline number even when underlying spending patterns haven’t changed much. Still, at just 1.5–1.6% of projected 2026 GDP, the fund’s readily spendable reserves are a fraction of what they were before the war, and economists at Russia’s own Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration have warned that, if current trends persist, the liquid portion of the fund could be exhausted entirely within a year or two.
It’s worth being precise about what “exhausted” would actually mean here. The NWF’s total assets — including illiquid, long-term holdings like equity stakes and infrastructure investments — remain much larger, on the order of 12–13 trillion rubles (upwards of $160 billion). That headline total sounds reassuring, and pro-Kremlin commentary tends to lean on it. But the liquid slice — the money that can actually be turned into cash on short notice to cover a budget shortfall — is a much smaller and faster-shrinking pool, and it’s that pool, not the total, that determines how much runway Russia actually has left before it needs another financing mechanism entirely.
Debt Is Cheap for Now, But Getting More Expensive
The other main lever the Kremlin has been pulling is domestic debt issuance — specifically, OFZ ruble-denominated government bonds sold primarily to Russian banks. Over just the first four months of 2026, the treasury raised roughly 1.7 trillion rubles net from these bond placements, covering close to 45% of the deficit accumulated during that period. That’s a substantial share, and it reflects something important: unlike many governments running large deficits, Russia hasn’t lost access to its domestic debt market, largely because Russian banks — often under regulatory encouragement — remain willing and able buyers of state debt.
But that financing isn’t free, and the cost is climbing. Prior to an April interest rate cut by the Central Bank, the Finance Ministry was paying between 14.5% and 15% annually to borrow. That’s an extraordinarily high cost of capital for a sovereign government, reflecting both Russia’s elevated policy rate (a legacy of the central bank’s fight against wartime inflation) and a risk premium investors demand given the broader uncertainty around Russian state finances. As the stock of outstanding debt grows and rolls over at these elevated rates, debt servicing costs consume a steadily larger share of the federal budget — a dynamic that compounds the underlying deficit problem rather than solving it. Notably, one analysis observed that this rising debt-service burden doesn’t appear to have altered the Finance Ministry’s spending calculus in any visible way, at least not yet.
There’s a further wrinkle that’s easy to overlook: the ruble has been relatively strong for much of 2026, which sounds like good news but actually compounds the budget’s revenue problem. Russia’s oil and gas tax revenue is calculated in dollar terms but ultimately collected and spent in rubles. When the ruble strengthens against the dollar, each dollar of oil revenue converts into fewer rubles — shrinking the ruble value of tax receipts even if dollar-denominated export earnings hold steady. Economists tracking the National Wealth Fund’s depletion risk have specifically flagged this combination — falling oil prices paired with a stronger ruble — as a double-edged force eroding the revenue base that Russian public spending has traditionally depended on.
Is This a Crisis, or Just a Slow Burn?
Given all of this — falling energy revenue, accelerating spending, a draining sovereign wealth fund, and rising borrowing costs — it’s reasonable to ask whether Russia is approaching some kind of fiscal breaking point. The honest answer, based on the available evidence, is: not imminently, but the trajectory is genuinely concerning, and the margin for error is shrinking.
One analysis from the New Eurasian Strategies Centre put it plainly: Russia’s fiscal picture looks alarming on paper, but the country’s financial machine hasn’t actually stalled. Reserves, while depleted relative to their prewar peak, are not zero. Borrowing, while getting more expensive, is still functioning. The state retains tools — further NWF drawdowns, more bond issuance, potential tax increases, and adjustments to the “budget rule” that governs how oil windfalls and shortfalls are smoothed over time — that give it room to keep spending even as the headline deficit numbers get worse. Revenue collection in 2026 has been running three to four percentage points behind the pace of recent years, which is a serious erosion, but not (yet) a collapse.
At the same time, several structural pressures argue against complacency. First, the pattern of underestimating deficits year after year suggests that whatever number the Finance Ministry is currently forecasting for full-year 2026 is more likely to be revised upward than downward as the year closes out — that’s simply been the track record for several years running. Second, the National Wealth Fund’s liquid reserves, the most flexible tool in the government’s kit, are on a downward trajectory that several independent economists believe could hit meaningful constraints within the next year or two if nothing changes. Third, the 20% consolidated spending growth documented through July raises real questions about sustainability — not just fiscally, but for the broader economy, with the Bank of Finland’s analysts explicitly flagging an increased risk that growth stalls out entirely if spending has to decelerate as sharply as current plans imply.
There’s also a geopolitical dimension that makes this fiscal story harder to forecast than an ordinary sovereign debt situation. Much of the volatility in Russia’s oil revenue this year — the sharp price spikes in March and April tied to Middle East disruptions, the subsequent retreat through the summer — has been driven by events entirely outside Moscow’s control. A government whose primary revenue source is this sensitive to unpredictable global shocks is, by definition, harder to plan for and harder to stabilize, regardless of how disciplined its domestic fiscal management might otherwise be. Sanctions policy adds another layer of uncertainty: the effectiveness of the Western price cap regime has varied significantly month to month, and any further tightening — or any easing, as happened briefly amid the Middle East crisis — has outsized effects on Russian tax receipts given how central oil and gas remain to the federal budget.
What to Watch Going Forward
For anyone tracking this story, a handful of indicators are worth following month to month rather than waiting for an annual figure. The monthly Finance Ministry budget releases — which come out with a short lag and get revised as more complete Treasury data arrives — are the single best real-time gauge of how the deficit is tracking against both the original budget law and the government’s own revised projections. The National Wealth Fund’s monthly liquid-asset figures are arguably even more important than the headline deficit number itself, since they show directly how much runway the state’s shock absorber has left. And the monthly Urals crude price and discount data, tracked closely by organizations monitoring sanctions compliance, offer an early read on where oil tax revenue is likely headed a month or two before it shows up in the official budget releases.
None of these indicators point to an immediate crisis. But taken together, they describe a government that is financing a growing share of its spending — including a large and largely non-negotiable military budget — through a combination of a shrinking reserve fund and increasingly expensive domestic borrowing, against a backdrop of energy revenue that has become structurally less reliable than it was before 2022. That’s not a story that resolves itself quickly in either direction. It’s the kind of slow-burn fiscal pressure that can persist for years without triggering an acute crisis — right up until some combination of shocks (a sustained oil price drop, a tightening of sanctions enforcement, a spike in borrowing costs, or simply the exhaustion of the NWF’s liquid reserves) forces a much more painful reckoning than anything visible in this month’s numbers alone.
For now, the deficit keeps widening, the reserves keep shrinking, and the spending keeps climbing. Whether 2026 ends with a deficit close to the government’s revised estimates or, as has happened in prior years, well beyond them, is likely to depend less on domestic fiscal discipline than on forces largely outside Russia’s control — global oil markets, the durability of Western sanctions enforcement, and the trajectory of a war that shows no sign of winding down its demands on the state budget.
Russia’s Budget: $79 Billion Deficit in 2026 — What the Growing Fiscal Gap Means
Russia’s federal budget is facing growing pressure in 2026 as government spending continues to run ahead of revenue. During the first seven months of the year, the federal budget deficit reached about 6.5 trillion rubles, equivalent to roughly $79 billion.
The $79 billion figure represents the accumulated federal budget gap from January through July 2026. It is not Russia’s total government debt and it is not the final deficit for the full year.
Russia’s Original 2026 Budget Target
Russia entered 2026 with a planned federal budget deficit of roughly 3.8 trillion rubles, equal to about 1.6% of GDP.
By the end of July, the deficit had reached approximately 6.5 trillion rubles. This means the seven-month deficit was already substantially higher than the original full-year target.
The final 2026 deficit will depend on government revenue, spending, oil prices, energy income, taxation and borrowing during the remaining months of the year.
Revenue and Government Spending
A government runs a budget deficit when it spends more money than it collects.
During the first seven months of 2026, Russia collected approximately 22.1 trillion rubles in federal revenue and spent about 28.6 trillion rubles.
The difference produced a deficit of roughly 6.5 trillion rubles.
Government spending has remained high, with defense, security, public services, infrastructure and other government programs contributing to overall expenditure.
Why Russia’s Budget Is Under Pressure
Several factors are contributing to the widening deficit.
High government spending is one of the main factors. Russia continues to maintain substantial defense and security expenditure while also funding domestic programs.
Oil and gas revenue is another major factor. Energy remains an important source of Russian government income, making the budget sensitive to changes in global oil prices, production, exports and taxation.
Inflation and borrowing costs also matter. Higher prices can increase government expenses, while higher interest rates can make deficit financing more expensive.
Oil and Gas Revenue
Oil and gas remain central to Russia’s public finances.
Russia is one of the world’s major energy producers, and government revenue is closely connected with the performance of the energy sector.
Higher oil prices can increase government income, while lower prices can reduce revenue.
Reuters reported that Russian oil and gas revenue was expected to increase in July 2026 because of higher oil prices and changes in oil-production taxation. However, cumulative oil and gas revenue for January through July was still expected to remain below the comparable period of 2025.
This makes energy prices one of the most important indicators for Russia’s fiscal outlook.
Military Spending
Military spending is another important part of Russia’s financial picture.
The war in Ukraine has required continued government expenditure on military personnel, equipment, production and related infrastructure.
High defense spending can support certain Russian industries because companies receive government contracts.
At the same time, these contracts represent substantial government expenditure.
The government therefore has to balance military priorities with pensions, healthcare, infrastructure, education and other domestic needs.
Inflation and Interest Rates
Russia’s fiscal policy is closely connected with inflation and monetary policy.
Strong government spending can increase demand for workers, goods and services.
If supply cannot keep up with demand, inflationary pressure can increase.
Higher inflation can reduce household purchasing power and increase business costs.
High interest rates create another challenge. Businesses face more expensive borrowing, consumers can face higher loan costs and the government can face greater expenses when issuing new debt.
The Debt Question
A budget deficit is different from government debt.
The deficit measures the amount by which spending exceeds revenue during a specific period.
Government debt represents accumulated borrowing and other obligations.
Russia can finance its deficit through domestic borrowing, financial reserves and other government mechanisms.
The important issue is whether the deficit remains manageable over time.
Domestic Borrowing
International sanctions have restricted Russia’s access to many Western financial markets.
As a result, domestic financial markets have become increasingly important for government borrowing.
Russian banks, institutional investors and other domestic investors can purchase government securities.
However, borrowing still has a cost. Higher interest rates can increase the amount the government must spend on debt servicing.
Impact on Russian Businesses
The budget deficit can have different effects on Russian businesses.
Companies that depend on government contracts may benefit from increased public spending.
Defense manufacturers, construction companies, transportation suppliers and some industrial businesses can receive additional demand.
Other businesses may face higher taxes, expensive credit and stronger competition for workers and materials.
The result is a mixed economic environment.
Impact on Consumers
Russian households can also feel the effects of fiscal policy.
Government spending can support employment in some industries.
However, inflation can reduce purchasing power.
Higher interest rates can make mortgages and other loans more expensive.
Changes in taxes, subsidies and government programs can also affect household finances.
For consumers, the budget deficit can eventually influence prices, wages, taxes and borrowing costs.
Russia and Global Energy Markets
Russia’s fiscal position is closely linked to global energy markets.
Russia remains a major producer and exporter of oil and other commodities.
Changes in Russian production, exports or taxation can influence international commodity markets.
At the same time, changes in global oil prices can directly affect Russia’s government revenue.
This creates a two-way relationship between Russia’s public finances and international energy markets.
Global Economic Impact
Russia’s budget matters to international markets because the country is an important supplier of energy, metals, fertilizers and agricultural products.
Changes in Russian fiscal or trade policy can affect companies involved in global commodity markets.
Oil prices, shipping costs, energy exports and international trade can all be influenced by developments surrounding Russia.
The Role of Sanctions
International sanctions have changed Russia’s financial and trading environment.
Russian companies have adjusted supply chains, payment systems and export markets.
Trade has increasingly shifted toward countries and markets that continue to conduct business with Russia.
These changes can increase transaction costs and affect access to some technologies and financial services.
The impact on government revenue depends partly on Russia’s ability to maintain export volumes and collect taxes.
What Could Russia Do Next?
Russia has several options for managing a larger budget deficit.
The government could increase domestic borrowing.
It could change taxes.
It could reduce or delay some spending.
It could use financial reserves.
It could adjust investment programs.
It could change energy-related taxation.
The government could also use several of these measures together.
Each option has potential advantages and disadvantages.
Higher borrowing increases future debt-service costs.
Higher taxes can increase government revenue but may put pressure on businesses.
Spending cuts can reduce the deficit but may affect economic activity and government priorities.
Using reserves provides immediate financial support but reduces the government’s financial cushion.
What Investors Should Watch
Investors and analysts will be watching several indicators during the remainder of 2026.
Oil and gas revenue
Federal tax revenue
Government spending
Domestic borrowing
Government bond yields
Inflation
Interest rates
Oil prices
Ruble exchange rates
Military expenditure
Government debt
Economic growth
These indicators will help determine whether Russia’s fiscal pressure is increasing or beginning to stabilize.
Why the Second Half of 2026 Matters
The remaining months of 2026 will be important for Russia’s final budget result.
The government will continue collecting taxes and energy revenue while also financing defense, public services and other programs.
If oil prices remain strong, energy revenue could provide additional support.
If oil prices fall or spending remains high, the deficit could become larger.
The final annual result will therefore depend on both revenue and expenditure.
The Bigger Picture
The $79 billion deficit should not be interpreted as evidence that Russia has suddenly run out of money.
Russia continues to collect substantial government revenue and has several financing options.
However, the rapid increase in the deficit compared with the original budget plan is an important fiscal development.
The key issue is whether the government can maintain high spending while keeping inflation, borrowing costs and public debt under control.
Russia’s Fiscal Challenge
Russia’s fiscal challenge is the result of several pressures occurring at the same time.
Government spending remains high.
Military expenditure remains significant.
Oil and gas revenue can fluctuate.
Inflation creates additional costs.
Interest rates affect borrowing.
International sanctions have changed access to global finance.
Together, these factors make budget management more complicated.
Conclusion
Russia’s federal budget deficit reached approximately 6.5 trillion rubles, or around $79 billion, during the first seven months of 2026.
The figure is significantly above Russia’s original full-year deficit target of roughly 3.8 trillion rubles.
The growing deficit reflects high government expenditure and pressure on some major sources of revenue.
Oil and gas remain especially important because energy income can change significantly with international oil prices, production levels, export conditions and taxation.
The remainder of 2026 will determine whether Russia can reduce the pace of deficit growth or whether the final annual deficit becomes substantially larger than originally planned.
For international investors, Russia’s budget remains important because it connects government finance with energy markets, inflation, interest rates, commodities and global trade.
The $79 billion figure is therefore more than a headline number. It shows the growing gap between Russia’s federal revenue and spending during a period of significant economic and geopolitical pressure.
Sources and References
Russian Ministry of Finance
https://minfin.gov.ru/en/
Bank of Russia
https://www.cbr.ru/eng/
Reuters — Russia Energy and Economy Coverage
https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/
International Monetary Fund
https://www.imf.org/
World Bank
https://www.worldbank.org/
Editorial Note: This article is original editorial analysis written in clear, human-readable language. Official reports and reputable news sources are used for verification rather than copied. Budget figures may change when new official data are released.
Figures cited are drawn from Russia’s Finance Ministry, Federal Treasury, Central Bank of Russia, and independent tracking by organizations including the Centre for Research on Energy and Clean Air, the Bank of Finland, and the Free Russia Foundation, current as of early-to-mid August 2026. Preliminary monthly figures are subject to revision as more complete data becomes available.